Nothing in the TRIPS Agreement limits compulsory licenses or other flexibilities to a narrow category of diseases. In the Doha Declaration itself, the U.S. requested an explicit limitation to particular diseases, and was the last country to assent to the unanimous resolution. 10 The ultimate compromise language states:
We recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.
11
At first blush, this appears to be a disease-specific limitation, but the Doha Declaration merely uses the Big 3 to illustrate examples of "national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency."
12
The Doha Declaration clearly supports WTO Members' rights to utilize TRIPS flexibilities -including compulsory licensure and parallel trade -to "protect public health" without regard to the type of disease: 13 Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. 14 This point has been honored primarily in the breach. Under the Doha Declaration "Paragraph 6" process, compulsory licenses could be issued for export to low-income countries, bypassing Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement, which restricts compulsory licenses predominantly for domestic use. When Canada enacted its Access to Medicines Regime to permit Paragraph 6 exports, the law limited compulsory licenses to specific listed 
10
GAO Trade Policy Report, supra note 7, at 23.
11
Doha Declaration, supra note 9, at par. 1.
12
Id. at par. 5(c).
13
Id. at par. 4, 5(b), 5(c), 5(d); GAO Trade Policy Report, supra note 7, at 11-26.
14 Doha Declaration, supra note 9, at par. 4.
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medicines. 15 This list has been criticized for its excessive narrowness -only 57 drugs or vaccines. 16 The list is effectively limited to AIDS and off-patent medications. Many of the listed drugs treat AIDS; and most of those AIDS drugs are available generically already. Almost all of the other drugs on the list are off-patent or face legal generic competition in a similar form. 17 The only patented non-AIDS drugs on the list are eflornithine (for the treatment of African sleeping sickness) and levofloxacin (an important antibiotic). Others are just curious choices considering the global burden of disease (testosterone injection). Ivermectin is also listed, despite Merck's promise to donate it in the river blindness campaign. The very narrow positive list in the Canadian Access to Medicines Regime operates as a disease-specific limitation on compulsory licensure under Paragraph 6.
More recently, major drug companies and USTR have resisted Thailand's efforts to issue compulsory licenses on patented drugs for heart disease and cancer.
18
When Thailand attempted to use the very TRIPS flexibilities guaranteed and encouraged by the Doha Declaration, a backlash ensued from conservative media, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the U.S. government. The Wall Street Journal editorial page attacked the Thai compulsory licenses as "seizures" that cynically distorted WTO rules, while a propertyrights activist group charged the Thai government with violating global trade rules.
19 Abbott, the manufacturer of lopinavir/ritonavir, withdrew pending applications for drugs in Thailand, including a heat-stable version of an important fixed-dose combination drug for AIDS with particular usefulness in a tropical climate.
20
The USTR then placed Thailand on the special 301 "priority watch list" for alleged violations of intellectual property law, mentioning in particular the compulsory license. The TRIPS Agreement is subject to dispute resolution under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, but the U.S. Government is unlikely to initiate a WTO panel against Thailand. The TRIPS Agreement authorizes members like Thailand to issue compulsory licenses for these drugs. 22 For all the bluster in the Wall Street Journal, it is clear that the controlling legal texts do not limit the use of TRIPS flexibilities to any particular set of diseases.
Nor should they. From the perspective of public health, limiting access programs and TRIPS flexibilities to particular diseases would be quite dangerous and unnecessary. Dangerous because the diseases of the world's rich and poor countries are converging, including non-communicative diseases such as heart disease, stroke, diabetes, cancer and depression. Radically cheaper medicines for these conditions could significantly improve health in LMICs. Limitation is also unnecessary because proven tools can be deployed to preserve high-income markets while LMICs pursue equitable flexibilities.
23
Perhaps another factor is at work here as well. An implicit assumption is that the diseases of developing countries are essentially different from diseases in the United States or Europe. Paradigmatic cases include exotic tropical diseases such as ebola hemorrhagic fever 24 and onchocerciasis (river blindness). These neglected diseases and their victims are so remote from the U.S. experience that special charitable programs seem unobjectionable. Only a very small portion of the disease burden in developing countries comes from these exotic tropical neglected diseases. 25 Drugs produced for high-income markets can treat most of the global disease burden, such as the pressing need for cancer therapies in LMICs, where cancer deaths outnumber AIDS deaths. 26 The number one cause of death in LMICs is not a neglected tropical disease, but a familiar "rich country" killer: heart disease.
27
To date, the important global legal texts retain broad application to all relevant diseases, but some parties continue to propose disease-specific limitations, most recently in the World Health Organization's Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and 22 Indeed, as the GAO reports, the USTR itself concedes the point. See GAO Trade Policy Report, supra note 7, at 48-49. The USTR stated that the decision to place Thailand on the Special 301 "priority watch list" was based "not solely on [Thailand's] Intellectual Property (the "WHO IGWG").
28
The WHO IGWG's task is to distill the WHO CIPIH Report into a global strategy and plan of action. This article hopes to influence the final text of the IGWG Global Strategy, finding that disease-specific limitations on access programs and TRIPS flexibilities are inappropriate in markets for medicines, but may have a place in markets for neglected disease innovation.
II. GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS FOR MEDICINES & INNOVATION
In order to understand the relevance of disease-specific limitations, we must distinguish between markets for medicines and markets for innovation. The patent system joins them together, using patent-protected high prices for medicines to create markets for innovation. James Love and Tim Hubbard have suggested separating these markets through a prize system and generic licensing, 29 but for the purposes of this article we need only to conceptually distinguish between the two. My aim is to evaluate whether significant differences exist between high-income countries and LMICs that are relevant to global pharmaceutical markets.
A. Markets for Medicines
IP rights stimulate pharmaceutical innovation by creating an artificial market enforced by patents, trademarks, and exclusivity periods. IP rights enable companies to charge higher prices, which make these medicines more expensive in the absence of generic competition. Patent rents can price most of humanity out of the market, reducing access to life-saving medicines.
30
Paul Hunt, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to the highest attainable standard of health, estimates that more than 2 billion people are effectively priced out of the market for patented drugs. 1996-99 (2007 The WHO CIPIH Report found that the effectiveness of IP rights depends greatly on the context, especially the poverty of the patients needing medicines:
But where most consumers of health products are poor, as are the great majority in developing countries, the monopoly costs associated with patents can limit the affordability of patented health-care products required by poor people in the absence of other measures to reduce prices or increase funding. Thus the overall effect of intellectual property regimes is context-specificthe impact in a country such as India may differ from that in Thailand or in Ghana.
33
In wealthier countries, access issues from IP-induced higher prices are ameliorated by government-subsidized insurance and other social mechanisms. The global market for medicines in high-income countries amounts to over $550 billion in 2006.
34 High prescription drug prices are often paid by government or social insurance funds. These payors are the primary global markets for patent-based drug companies, even though some exercise monopsony power to negotiate lower drug prices. 35 Outside of the 39 Many purchases of inpatient pharmaceuticals are paid through public funds in Medicare Part A or Medicaid, amounting to tens of billions of dollars per year. Even with these subsidies, drug access problems re-emerge in the U.S. when out-of-pocket costs are high.
40
Even privately-insured U.S. purchasers receive significant tax subsidies. More than 47% of U.S. outpatient pharmacy expenditures were covered by private insurance, which itself draws a significant tax subsidy. 41 The income tax exclusion for employer-provided health insurance is a tax expenditure estimated at $102.3 billion in fiscal year 2004.
42
Since outpatient pharmaceuticals accounted for approximately 10% of U.S. health spending in 2005, 43 this provision alone is a $10 billion tax expenditure supporting the domestic pharmaceutical market. Soc. 1974 Soc. , 1974 Soc. (2007 The cost of extending market exclusivity is unclear, but can easily exceed billions of dollars.
B. Markets for Pharmaceutical Innovation

64
The appropriate adjustments for these incentives may be conservatively estimated at no less than $15 billion globally, particularly when incentives from outside the U.S. and reimbursement incentives are included.
65
As adjusted, public investments in health R&D are probably significantly larger than private for-profit investments (see Table 1 ). In its comments to the WHO IGWG, the U.S. Government called for additional "tax credits to encourage research and development into medicines related to neglected or orphan diseases." U.S. Government Comments on Annexes I and II of the World Health Organization (WHO) Secretariat's Elements of a Global Strategy and Plan of Action, at 8, Doc. A /PHI/IGWG/1/5, available at www.who.int/phi/submissions/USA-Comments.pdf [hereinafter, U.S. Comments].
To a large extent, high-income country governments make the market for pharmaceuticals.
Given this fact, separating the public and private contributions to pharmaceutical R&D becomes exceedingly difficult. But it is clear that direct measures of R&D greatly understate the public contributions through tax expenditures, regulatory exclusivity, and public reimbursement. The lion's share comes from the public purse.
C. Implications for LMICs
The patent-based pharmaceutical R&D and distribution systems in highincome countries function as well as they do in large part because of elaborate and expensive subsidy and social insurance mechanisms. Poorer countries generally lack these resources. They cannot afford multi-billion dollar NIHstyle grant programs to focus attention on local health conditions. They do not subsidize the cost of the vast array of patented medicines to the point where they are affordable.
67 Their citizens are much poorer and cannot afford most patented medicines. Global pharmaceutical markets simply do not work as well for the world's non-wealthy people, perhaps 85% of humanity.
68
Special provisions for enhanced access to medicines and TRIPS flexibilities are called for in these situations, especially if access can be provided without undermining optimal incentives for innovation in high-income markets. Furthermore, the following section describes why disease-specific limitations are inappropriate.
III. GLOBAL DISEASE BURDENS
While pharmaceutical markets vary significantly with the wealth of customers and governments, variations in global disease burdens call for careful analysis. As described above, attempts have been made to limit access initiatives and TRIPS flexibilities to specific diseases or categories, such as the "Big 3" infections diseases (AIDS/HIV, malaria and tuberculosis) or "public health emergencies." Similarly, global drug companies have generally limited their differential pricing policies in LMICs to drugs treating AIDS, malaria and a small number of other drugs. 69 An implicit assumption is that these conditions represent the greatest disease burdens in LMICs. In fact, these infectious diseases are not the most significant drivers of disease burden in 67 Brazil has fully subsidized the price of AIDS medications as part of its aggressive treatment and prevention program. The high price had prevented Brazil from making similar commitments across other treatment categories. WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 97-100 fig. 4 The top ten causes of death and burden of disease in LMICs (see Table 2 ) include several conditions that are also top killers in high-income countries, in addition to more "traditional" diseases of poverty. 
IV. MARKETS AND THE GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE
The WHO CIPIH Report took a different taxonomic path to describe the global burden of disease, following the terminology of the Commission on Macroeconomics & Health (CMH). 79 The CMH and the WHO CIPIH Report categorized diseases with a market-based approach, according to their intrinsic appeal to global capitalism, and in particular with reference to the markets for innovation and medicine.
A. Type I Disease Innovations
Type I diseases occur in high-income countries. The purchasing power of the high-income countries drives innovation for Type I diseases. Examples The WHO CIPIH Report strongly noted the growing rate of noncommunicable disease. WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 2-5, 44. 85 A relatively small number of deaths in high-income countries led to these two HPV vaccines that hold great promise in LMICs as well. These vaccines could be provided generically to the poorest without undermining optimal innovation. The deaths of less than 17,000 women per year in wealthy countries offered sufficient financial rewards to prompt both Merck and GlaxoSmithKline to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to bring HPV vaccines to market. The deaths of more than 222,000 poor women per year may have provided moral, scientific or humanitarian incentives to create HPV vaccines, but the potential financial rewards were modest, since these women cannot afford it.
86 Merck has announced an equitable access program, 87 and some limited donations, but the scope of the program remains unknown at the present. (Sept. 26, 2007) . Three million doses will vaccinate one million women, a very small percentage of the need.
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Many have recognized the market failures inherent in Type III diseases.
89
For these diseases, normal market conditions will be inadequate to stimulate sufficient R&D. Impoverished sick people are not attractive markets for global for-profit R&D programs.
90 Type III disease innovation will require substantial non-market incentives, such as public-private product development partnerships 91 and market-making devices such as Advanced Market Commitments 92 or patent prizes.
93
Others look to non-market incentives such as grants and government-sponsored research. 94 Occasionally, proposals are coupled with an expansion of IP rights in poor countries, 95 or a choice between exercising IP rights in either developed or developing countries, but not both.
96
Expanded IP rights are an unnecessary and unwelcome addition for neglected disease research. Expansion of IP rights will not create incentives in the absence of money to buy the product. These diseases are neglected due to the poverty of the afflicted, not the lack of IP rights. 97 While Type III diseases are significant, we should note that total global deaths from the tropical-disease cluster in 2001 were only 128,000 people. 98 Residents of LMICs suffer from higher infectious disease burdens, but much of the DALYs lost stems from noncommunicable diseases, injuries, and communicable diseases other than the tropical and neglected disease cluster. Type II diseases occupy an intermediate category, sharing some characteristics of the other categories. LMICs suffer a disproportionately large burden from Type II diseases. Tuberculosis and malaria were once Type I diseases, but are now classified as Type II by the WHO after virtual eradication of malaria in the U.S. and Europe, and a significantly lower disease burden from tuberculosis in high-income countries. Malaria is classified as Type II rather than Type III because it retains a small but significant financial footprint in the high-income countries to meet the needs of the military and international travelers. If multiple-drug resistant and extremely-drug resistant tuberculosis spread significantly in high-income countries, tuberculosis may regain Type I status.
Innovation in Type II diseases also occupies an intermediate category. In many cases, innovation for high-income markets will be sufficient to create the necessary drugs. Such was the case with AIDS and the existing treatments for malaria and tuberculosis. But the global medical burden of malaria and tuberculosis has outmatched the innovation spurred by relatively modest high-income country markets. Type II diseases will require additional nonmarket incentives to fully correlate global need with innovation incentives.
100
The WHO Commission classified AIDS as a Type II disease, 101 but that appears to be a debatable choice. AIDS is perhaps better classified as a Type I disease. While the greatest burden of AIDS disease falls outside of highincome countries, more than 2 million people are living with HIV in highincome countries 102 and infection rates are rising. 103 This high-income patient base is more than sufficient to spur innovation. The AIDS cases in the U.S. and Europe sparked an avalanche of research, even before the true scope of the global crisis was known. AIDS may be considered a Type I disease at present, with the exception of adaptive research. Other adaptive innovations may require non-market incentives, similar to other neglected disease issues.
D. Adaptive Innovations for Type I Diseases
E. Important Distinctions Between Markets for Innovation and Medicine
The WHO typology is helpful for analyzing differences in the markets for innovation and medicine between high-income countries and LMICs. Disease-specific incentives are required for innovation market failures in Type II and III diseases, but limitations are not appropriate for access programs and TRIPS flexibilities. The relevant factors are summarized in Table 3 below: 
Innovation Market Medicine Market Type I -HICs
High-income country purchasing power drives the market (ex: Lipitor for high cholesterol).
Innovation follows purchasing power rather than medical need (ex: additional lifestyle and metoo drugs rather than a first-inclass Gram-negative antibiotic).
Patent protection and sophisticated branding and marketing yield high drug prices.
The impact of high prices is ameliorated by private and social insurance mechanisms, relatively high per capita incomes, and (in some cases) government monopsony procurement.
-LMICs Adaptive R&D may be needed to account for resourceconstrained settings (ex. nonrefrigerated vaccines, polyvalent HPV vaccines, fixed-dose combinations).
Regional companies may be able to supply some adaptive R&D. The balance must be Patent-based pricing denies access to the majority of direct purchasers.
Robust generic competition would drive prices closer to marginal cost (ex. provided through non-market incentives.
AIDS programs).
Type II -HICs
Largely ignored by high-income markets, except by tourists, military and other modest markets (ex: prophylaxis for malaria).
Patented Significant unmet medical need in LMICs.
V. DISEASE-SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS IN THE WHO IGWG
With this background, we now turn to the current discussions within the WHO IGWG concerning disease-specific limitations. The December 14, 2007 draft of the WHO Draft Global Strategy (2007) 110 frequently uses the following disease-limiting phrase or its permutations: "diseases which disproportionately affect developing countries."
111
The phrase was prominently discussed in the WHO CIPIH Report, 112 and was mentioned in the World Health Assembly Resolution that established the IGWG. 113 The phrase is occasionally used as an apparent synonym for Type II and III diseases.
